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 Significant exploitation and utilization of cloud computing in industry is 
come with and in the identical time vulnerable by unease regarding 
protection of data hold by cloud computing providers. One of the penalties of 
moving data processing and storage off business site is that organizations 
have fewer controls over their infrastructure. seeing that, cloud service (CS) 
providers must hope that the CS provider is capable to protect their data and 
infrastructure from both exterior and domestic attacks. Presently however, 
such hope can only rely on organizational procedures stated by the CS 
provider and cannot be remotely verified and validated by an external party. 
The central distinction between cloud computing and conventional enterprise 
internal Information Technology services is that the proprietor and the 
consumer of cloud Information Technology infrastructures are separated in 
cloud. This transform requires a safety responsibility severance in cloud 
computing. Cloud service providers (CSP) should safe the services they 
propose and cannot surpass the customers’ authorities. Virtualization is a 
buildup utterance in the Information Technology world. With the assure to 
reduce the ever mounting infrastructure inside data centers connected to 
other important apprehensions such as ease of use and scalability, 
virtualization technology has been in advance recognition not only with IT 
experts yet also among administrators and executives as well. The 
progressively more growing rate of the approval of this technology has 
exposed these systems to new protection concerns which in recent history 
have been unnoticed or merely overlooked. This paper presents an in depth 
state of art gaze at  present most old server virtualization explanations, as 
well as a writing study on different security matters found inside this 
virtualization technology. These problems can be practical to all the existing 
virtualization technologies accessible with no spotlight on a specific answer. 
Nevertheless, we do susceptibility investigation of two of the mainstream 
recognized virtualization answers: VMware ESX and Xen. to conclude, we 
illustrate some clarifications on how to progress the security of online 
banking and electronic commerce, using virtualization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
We are walking into the age of cloud computing. Cloud computing is a new type of Information 
Technology service in which customers make use of the cloud computing infrastructures such as CPU 
capability, network and storages provided by cloud service providers (CSP). Cloud computing can assist to 
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condense Information Technology cost of SME’s in that they require not to procure their own Information 
Technology infrastructures and utilize an Information Technology team again. For the meantime, as the price 
of customary domestic Information Technology communications is fetching a serious load to SME, cloud 
computing can also assist to build them supplementary aggressive [1]. Present we have three archetypal cloud 
service delivery models: Software as a Service, Platform as a Service and Infrastructure as a Service The 
inter rapport and logical margins of these 3 cloud service deployment models were described in the Cloud 
Reference Architecture as demonstrated in Figure 1 [2]. Because these three service release models offer 
diverse stages of service, the safety level that CSP promise to consumers should also be dissimilar. CSA 
believes that CSP should take on the greatest quantity of security accountability in SaaS model and the least 
amount of security dependability in IaaS model, while in PaaS model, security accountability must be 
carefully leveraged by the CSP and customers [2]. Virtualization has profoundly changed the information 
technology (IT) industry in different areas such as network, operating systems, applications or storage. 
Virtualization is a subject that not only IT people concern now. It has gained space on the administrators and 
directors vocabulary. Companies have apprehended that most of their systems were operates at share of 10 
percent or less of utilization, yet these systems continue to require space, power and cooling system as any 
other machine. Tumbling these necessities would have a straight crash in dropping the Information 
Technology budget and atmosphere cares as the carbon footstep. Virtualization technology was the solution 
found by many companies, moving this technology into the mainstream. According to a recent IDC survey 
[2], companies that have deployed virtualization could see a return of investment of 472 percent in less than a 
year. The increased utilization and consolidation of x86 architectures had significant job for this also. Many 
companies use this architecture since it has lesser cost contrasted with others in the marketplace. Though, this 
structure had historically hardware support issues for virtualization which significant degrade the 
performance of the virtual machine weigh against with the same structure operates on a physical host. In 
order to solve this issue, AMD and Intel executed architectural additions to directly support virtualization in 
hardware. This conquers the traditional virtualization restrictions of the x86 architecture, improving 
significant characteristics like performance and scalability creating x86 server virtualization a keystone of 
most IT consolidation projects. The increasing investment and implementation of virtualization is 
comparable to the implementation of internet in companies at the end of the last decade. However, in the 
same way, security was not the top priority, Even though Information Technology administrators are now 
more rational to this theme. The threat of this latest technology are a little argued almost only at security 
actions such as Black Hat and it continues to be out of the focus of many allusion and advisor companies that 
employ this expertise. Virtualization has been presented to companies as an out-of-the-box answer that 
companies do not have to worry about, as if it was physical machines with the advantages that the hardware 
virtualized does not “crack” as the physical infrastructure. There is some mythology to split when condensate 
about virtualization security and this mythology happen because, as other myths, there is not much 
information about it. Some people assume that having, for instance, 4 virtual machines operates on a physical 
machine is the same as having 4 physical machines and so the concerns should be the same (e.g. only install 
patches on the operating system inside the virtual machine). Perhaps this myth exists because there is a 
common sense that hypervisors are impenetrable, which is false as we are going to see later in this paper. 
Some IT directors are not aware of the security intensity whereas using virtualization. For example, by means 
of virtualization it is feasible to pause or take a picture of a virtual machine that has reasonable information 
as cryptographic keys or password in memory and most companies do not look to these snapshots as critical 
assets as the running virtual machines. This paper presents a study about virtualization, focusing in security 
problems as the ones described on the previous paragraph. It covers both server and desktop environments 
and virtualization software. Regarding servers, we have conducted a vulnerability study, comparing two 
virtualization solutions, while for the desktops we have made a study about how virtualization can be used to 
improve security for online banking and e-commerce. 
 
 
2. EXISTING SYSTEM AND RELATED WORK 
2.1. Virtualization 
Defining virtualization is not an easy task because as we will see later, there are different types of 
virtualization and a definition that would be adequate for all is not easy to achieve. Singh [13] describes 
virtualization as “framework or methodology of dividing the resources of a computer into multiple 
implementation environments, by concerning one or more notions or technologies such as software 
partitioning, hardware division, time-sharing, partial or complete machine simulation, emulation, worth of 
service, and many others”. While, this description leaves out bags as virtualization in the network, 
application virtualization or storage virtualization. Kiyanclar [14] describes virtualization as “the consistent 
duplicate of a complete architecture in software that presents the illusion of a real machine to all software 
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running above it”. Most of the definitions are correct if we only consider server virtualization; nevertheless, I 
adapted Singh’s definition saying that: Definition. Virtualization is as a framework dividing the resources of 
the device from the execution environment, allowing environment plurality by using one or more techniques 
such as time-sharing, emulation, partitioning. 
 
2.2. CPU Virtualization 
The x86 architecture is the majority used CPU design in enterprise data-centers today. The 
virtualization can take benefits of that. The Intel 80286 chip-set, introduced on February 1982, was the first 
of the x86 family to provide two main methods of addressing memory: real mode and protected mode. Later, 
in 1985, with the 80386 chipset, a third mode was introduced called virtual 8086 mode (also called virtual 
real mode, V86-mode or VM86). The VM86 allowed multiple real mode processes to be run simultaneously 
while taking full advantage of the 80386 protection mechanism. Real mode soon became obsolete because it 
had some disadvantages, such as it was limited to a one megabyte of memory and only one program can be 
run at a time. The same way, virtual mode was locked in at 16-bit and became obsolete with the high use of 
32-bit operating system. Protected mode, by the other hand, is the natural 32-bit environment of the 80386 
processor providing many features in order to support multitasking, such as hardware support for virtual 
memory and segmenting processor. Protected mode in the x86 family uses 4 privilege levels, numbered from 
0 to 3. Sometimes these levels are designated as rings, and the term comes from the MULTICS system [17], 
in which privilege levels were illustrated as a set of concentric rings. We are about to employ the word “ring” 
as level, because it is a vocabulary is old. System memory is divided into segments and each segment is 
assigned and dedicated to a particular ring. The processor uses the privilege ring to decide what actions can 
be done with the code or data within a segment. As it shows in the Figure 2, Ring 0 is considered the 






Figure 2. Privilege rings of the x86 architecture. High privilege:0; Low privilege: 3 
 
 
The supervisor mode is the execution mode on an x86 processor with unrestricted access, which 
enables the executions of all instruction, including I/O and memory management operations, which are 
privileged instructions. Operating system runs on this supervisor mode, normally on the ring 0. However if 
this ring is compromised, it will have direct impacts on the ring 3 (user mode). The idea of having isolated 
ring 0 for each virtualized guest is that if one of the ring 0 of a virtualized guest is affected by, for instance, a 
failure it will not have impact the ring 0 of others virtualized guest. In order to do this, it is necessary to make 
this ring 0 closer to the guest, residing in either ring 1 or ring 2 for x86 architectures. However, the further it 
goes from the real ring 0, the more distant is from executing direct hardware operations, resulting in a loss of 
performance and independence. Virtualization moves ring 0 up one level in the privilege rings model and 
places the virtual machine monitor in the next higher privilege ring. This will be the ring 0 and it is upon this 
the guest operating systems runs, while the Virtual Machine Monitor controls the interaction with the 
underlying hardware platform. VMMs can be classified in two types: 
a. Type 1: This type is also called as native or bare metal since the hypervisor software operates on top of 
the host’s hardware on the real ring 0 (Figure 3(a)). A guest operating system thus runs on another level 
above the hypervisor, allowing for true isolation of each virtual machine. This is the classic VM architecture. 
An example of this implementation is the VMware ESX Server and Xen. 
IJECE  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
A Survey on Security Aspects of Server Virtualization in Cloud Computing (O Sri Nagesh) 
1329 
b. Type 2: This type is also called hosted VMM because the hypervisor software runs within a normal host 
operating system previously mounted, usually in ring 3 (Figure 3(b)). This type of VMM has a lower 
performance than the other type because factors as calls to the hardware must traverse many diverse layers 
before the operations are returned to the guest operating system. Examples of this implementation include 









Figure 3. (a) Type 1 Hypervisor/VMM, (b) Type 2 Hypervisor/VMM 
 
 
2.3. Memory Virtualization 
Standard operating system employs page-tables to converts addresses which are virtual and 
converted into addresses which physical data is provided. Virtual machines gives raise to new observations 
about memory virtualization since memory is going to be shared although isolation as to be guaranteed. We 
can consider three classes of addresses on a virtualized system: 
a. Virtual addresses, which are the same as the ones used by a conventional OS • Guest physical address 
b. Machine memory 
Operating systems which are guests will maintain page tables that translate from virtual addresses to 
pseudo-physical addresses, and hypervisor preserves individual shadow page tables that translate from virtual 
addresses to device or system addresses [24]. 
The current x86 CPUs hold memory in hardware. Translation from virtual to physical addresses is 
performed by the memory management unit and the most used parts of the page tables are cached in the 
translation look aside buffer (TLB). Guest OS sees page tables, which run on an emulated MMU. These 
tables provide the guest OS with the false impression that it can interpret the virtual guest OS addresses into 
physical addresses of the machine, but it is the hypervisor that deals with it. The real page table is the shadow 
page table used to translate the virtual addresses of the guest OS into the real physical pages. 
The classic implementation of hypervisors maintains a shadow page table, which allows to control 
what page of the machine’s memory is available to a virtual machine. Just like in a traditional operating 
system’s virtual memory subsystem, when the memory allocated to VMs exceed the host physical memory 
size, the hypervisor can page the VM to the disk. This way, the hypervisor can dynamically control how 





Figure 4. ESX Server Memory Mapping 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
IJECE  Vol. 7, No. 3, June 2017 :  1326 – 1336 
1330 
2.4. Device and I/O Virtualization 
The VMM virtualizes the physical hardware and allows each virtual machine a set of customizable 
virtual devices. Most of this virtualized I/O requires software drivers that run on the host operating system to 
access the real hardware. If it is a type 2 hypervisor, then it will use the device drivers already in the host OS, 
otherwise it may be necessary to develop its own device drivers for the hardware on the machine, like in the 
case of VMware ESX. Emulation is normally used for a VMM to handle I/O devices, and it is the VMM the 
responsible to implement a software model of the I/O device, making believe the guest OS that it is 
communicating to a hardware device, when is communicating with a software model. The I/O virtualization 
may provide to the guest, virtual hardware that does not exist in the real hardware, for instance, emulating an 
IDE hard disk when the real hardware is SATA. The direct memory access (DMA) has problems when used 
with virtual machines. The DMA controller can write to the entire physical memory instead of only the 
memory assigned to the guest OS. In order to deal with this problem, Intel and AMD added I/O Memory 
Management Unit (IOMMU). With IOMMU it is possible to restrict which physical address a device may 
access.  
 
2.5. Types of Virtualization 
When people talk about virtualization, normally they are talking about server virtualization. 
However, information technology has other forms of virtualization commonly known and used by other 
groups of people. For some, virtualization means storage virtualization, or network virtualization or even 
application virtualization. Although my thesis will only concern about server virtualization, I will do a brief 
explanation of each one. 
 
2.5.1. Server Virtualization 
There are many different implementations of server virtualization on, and for a big range of CPU 
platforms and architectures. Informally, server virtualization can be seen as creating many virtual systems 
within a single physical system. To accomplish this, we can take three approaches: physical layer, 
virtualization layer and OS layer. Hardware partitioning divides a single physical server into partitions where 
each partition is able to run an operating system while hypervisor places a layer of software between the 
physical hardware and the multiple operating systems that will share the same physical hardware. 
Physical Layer: 
• Hardware partitioning: The server is physically segmented into distinct smaller systems that will act as a 
physically independent and self-contained server. Normally each of these smaller systems has their own 
CPUs, OS, boot area, memory and network resources. The implementation of this technique includes Static 
Hard Partitioning, vPar, nPar among others [27]. 
Virtualization layer: Hypervisor technology can be organized in some distinct categories: 
• Full virtualization: Allows virtual infrastructures to run unmodified operating systems in separation. Present 
operating system (OS) executing inside the virtual machine is called guest operating system. This approach 
was pioneered in 1967 with IBM CP-40 and CP-67, predecessors of VM family. In order to implement full 
virtualization, it is necessary a full combination of hardware and software, however not all architectures have 
hardware to support virtualization. It was not achievable on IBM System/370 until 1972 and it was not 
natively possible in the x86 architecture [28] until 2005 when Intel and AMD added the hardware 
virtualization extensions (Intel VT and AMD-V respectively). Nevertheless, many companies tried to 
accomplish full virtualization on x86 architecture even before Intel VT and AMD-V additions. VMware uses 
a combination of direct implementation with binary translation techniques [29] to accomplish full 





Figure 5. The Binary Translation Approach to x86 Virtualization used by VMware 
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• Para virtualization: modifies the guest kernel system in order to purge the necessity of binary translation. It 
has the advantage of higher performance but has the drawback of needing a modified operating system 
kernel. The fact the virtual platform is not identical to the real hardware, it makes necessary for the operating 
system to be ported to the abstracted machine interface. This could be seen as a violation of the Goldberg’s 
equivalence requirements, because the architecture-dependent part of the operating system kernel needs to be 
changed [30]. The non virtualizable instructions are replaced with hypercalls that communicate directly with 
the virtualization layer hypervisor. The architecture independent part and the entire user mode software stack 
stay unmodified. 
• Emulation: Occasionally community confounds emulation with full virtualization. Even though both 
operate unmodified guest operating systems, they are both very different. In emulation, the virtual machine 
simulates the entire hardware set needed to run the unmodified guest OS normally for a completely different 
hardware architecture. There are some utilities for this technique. 
Operating System layer: 
• Operating System-Level Virtualization: This is a technology that virtualizes servers at the OS (kernel) 
layer. The physical server and instance of the OS is virtualized into multiple isolated partitions. Each of them 
will look like a real server, from the point of view of its owner. The OS kernel will run a single OS and 
provide its functionality to each of the partitions. 
 
2.5.2. Storage Virtualization 
Storage virtualization has been around for a number of years. It has beginning with the use of 
redundant array of independent disks (RAID). Using RAID it is possible to logically group physical disks 
and present those groupings as a virtual disk to the OS. Using storage virtualization it is possible to merge 
physical storage from many devices which will appear as a single storage pool. This storage can be classified 
as direct attached storage (DAS), network attached storage (NAS) and storage area network (SAN). They can 
be linked using Fibre Channel, Fibre Channel and Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI), Fibre 
Channel on Ethernet or Network File System (NFS). Storage virtualization it is not a requirement for server 
virtualization but its use provides benefits since it can rely on the assignation of a logical unit (LUN) of 
storage, but provisioning it only when needed. For instance, if we have a LUN of 500 GB but we are only 
using 20GB, then only 20GB of actual storage is provisioned. This reduces the cost of storage, since we only 
use what is needed. Storage virtualization brings also help to the storage administrator, since it is easier to 
manage tasks as backup, archiving or recovery. 
 
2.5.3. Network Virtualization 
When people talk about network virtualization, probably the first thing that comes to their minds is 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) or perhaps Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN). 
The most used network virtualizations are: 
a. Virtual LAN (VLAN): Defined in the IEEE 802.1Q standard, is a method of creating independent 
networks using a shared physical network. They are used to logically segment broadcast domains and 
control the interaction between different network segments. VLANS is a common feature in all modern 
Ethernet switches, allowing to create multiple virtual networks, which isolates each segment from the 
others. All the available resources are segments and allocated to each of these segments. Therefore, 
VLAN is a safe method of creating independent or isolate logical networks within a shared physical 
network. 
b. Virtual IP (VIP): A VIP is an IP address that is not associated to a specific computer or network interface, 
but is normally assigned to a network device that is in-path of the network traffic. Incoming packets are 
sent to the VIP but are redirected to the actual network interface of the receiving host or hosts. It is used 
in solutions like High-Available and Load-Balancing, where multiple systems have a common 
application, and they are able to receiving the traffic as redirected by the network device. 
c. Virtual Private Network (VPN): It is a private communication network that uses public network, such as 





Founded in 1998 by Diane Greene and Dr. Mendel Rosenblum along with two students from 
Stanford University and a colleague from Berkley, VMware is a well known company on the x86 
virtualization market. In October of the same year, these five founders filed for a patent regarding new 
virtualization techniques. These techniques were supported by a project called Sim-OS carried out at 
Stanford University. The U.S. Patent 6,397,242 was awarded on May 28, 2002 [42]. 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
IJECE  Vol. 7, No. 3, June 2017 :  1326 – 1336 
1332 
Their first product was VMware Workstation with the first version being released on February 8, 
1999 for Windows and Linux. This is one of the mainly victorious products from VMware for desktop and 
stays as a commercial product with its current version 6.5.x. VMware Workstation is a type 2 hypervisor, 
supported on top of a Host OS – either Windows or Linux – and able to create virtual machines for a variety 
of guests OS, such as Solaris x86, Netware, FreeBSD, Windows and Linux. In late 2000, they released their 
first version of the server virtualization platform called VMware GSX Server. In 2006, VMware GSX Server 
was renamed to VMware Server and it is now released as freeware. In 2001, VMware release their first 
version of Elastic Sky X (ESX) [43].  
 
3.1. ESX Platform 
The core of VMware ESX has three main modules capable of regulating CPU affinity, memory 
allocation and oversubscription, network bandwidth throttling and I/O bandwidth control. Along with these, 
Virtual Machine File System completes the VMware ESX base platform. The three primary components of 
VMware ESX are: Physical Host Server: This is related with the physical host server where VMware ESX 
runs on.  
VMkernel: The VMkernel is the center of the VMware ESX hypervisor, and it is a high 
performance operating system developed by VMware to run on the ESX host server. 
The Console Operating System (COS): The service relieve has been promoted from being  based on 
a variant of Red Hat version 7.2 with ESX 2.x to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3, Update 6 for ESX 3.0 [45] and 
Update 8 for ESX 3.5 [46]. 
Virtual Machine File System (VMFS): The VMFS is a high performance cluster file system created 
by VMware. VMFS has many advantages compared to conventional file system. 
VirtualCenter: The VMware VirtualCenter is the management console used to control the 
virtualized enterprise environments. 
 
3.2. VMware ESXi 
VMware ESXi was announced during VMworld 2007 and it is an integrated version of VMware 
ESX but without the COS. This is important in terms of security. VMware ESXi had RHEL-based COS 
replaced with BusyBox, which is a single binary that provides a minimal set of services. Many of the security 
patches for VMware ESX where related with security vulnerabilities on the Service Console (e.g. CVE-2009-
1185, CVE-2009- 0034, CVE-2009-0846). 
 
3.3. Xen 
The Xen project was first described in the paper “Xen and the Art of Virtualization” presented at 
SOSP in 2003 [49]. It was a project originated by the System Reseach Group at the University of Cambridge 
Computer Laboratory and was part of the XenoServers projects [50] which had the goal of build a public 
infrastructure for global-scale service deployment. XenSource, Inc. was a company founded by Ian Pratt, 
senior lecturer at Cambridge and lead of the Xen project, with the goal of supporting and developing the open 
source Xen project and to create a commercial enterprise version of the software. In 2005, XenSource release 
Xen 3.0. 
Xen is an open-source hypervisor for both 32 and 64 bit process architecture that runs on top of the 
bare-metal. It allows to securely and efficiently run several virtual guest OS on the same host at the same 
time. Xen as many features as: 
a. Near native performance on the virtual machines 
b. Full support on x86 (32-bit) with and without Physical Address Extension (PAE) 
c. Full support on x86 with 64-bit expansion 
d. Support for almost all hardware with Linux drivers available 
e. Live migration of running virtual machines between two physical hosts with zero downtime 
f. Support of Hardware Virtualization extensions from Intel (Intel-VT) andAMD(AMDV), allowing 
unmodified guest operating systems. 
 
3.4. KVM 
KVM stands for Kernel-based Virtual Machine and is full virtualization tool for Linux on x86 
machine, on the basis of virtualization in hardware extensions (Intel VT-X and AMDV) and an adopted 
version of QEMU, using the Linux Kernel as the Hypervisor [53]. KVM cannot operte on CPUs without the 
hardware virtualization extensions. KVM consists of two modules: 
a. kvm.ko: A loadable kernel module that provides the core virtualization infrastructure 
b. kvm-[intel|amd].ko: A processor specific module for Intel or ADM. 
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4. SECURITY OF VIRTUAL MACHINES 
Virtual Machine technology is mainstream, implemented on every branch of the industry (e.g. 
Telecom, Finance), running critical services, which were previously implemented in isolated servers. One 
important issue is security. According to Gartner [60], "through 2009, 60 percent of production VMs will be 
less secure than their physical counterparts" and that "30 percent of deployments [will be associated] with a 
VM-related security incident". With virtualization, a new scenario is presented, with all the servers 
consolidated on a single server running three virtual machines. In this case, a new threat model (Figure 6(b) 
on page 46) allows not only the same attacks as the traditional model but also opens the possibility to do new 
attacks and explore new vulnerabilities. Since each VM can be “exactly the same” as the real one (in the 
sense that it can have, for instance, the same number of CPUs, amount of memory, patches installed and 
configuration), an attacker can explore a vulnerability in an application the same way as it was done on the 
traditional threat model (arrows #1). Besides that, she has new targets to check for vulnerabilities. If the 
virtualization layer have vulnerabilities, she could launch an attack from a guest OS against the others VMs 
in the same host (arrows #2), or could attack the host by doing a denial of service exploring the host 
vulnerability in a virtual device . Doing this attack, she could attack the other guests in the same host (arrows 
#3). The impact of compromise the virtualization layer raises the risk’s level, since it is a critical asset shared 






Figure 6. (a)Traditional threat model, (b) New threat model 
 
 
5. ANALYZE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN VIRTUALIZATION 
5.1. Attackes from the Guest to the Host 
There can be some external or internal factors that can compromise isolation as miss implementation 
configuration or some bug in the virtualization software. Any attacks can be made if isolation between the 
Virtual Machine and the host which may be dangerous. Any one may be compromised causes dangerous 
effects.That attack is called ”VM escape” and happens when a program can bypass the virtual machine layer 
from inside a VM and get access to the host machine. The host machine is the root of all the VMs, and so if a 
program escapes from the virtual machines privileges it will get root, allowing to control all the VMs and the 
traffic between them. This kind of attack are normally possible by exploiting bugs on the VMM combined 
with improperly configuration of the host/guest interaction. However, current VMMs do not offer perfect 
isolation, although they claim to. Many bugs have been found in all popular VMMs, some of them allowing 
”VM escape”, like the VMware Workstation 6 CVE-2007-4496 [62] bug discovered by Rafal Wojtczuk 
which allows authenticated users with administrative privileges on a guest operating system to corrupt 
memory and possibly execute arbitrary code on the host operating system via unspecified vectors. 
 
5.2.  Remote Management Vulnerabilities 
It is common in the current VM Environments to have a management consoles that manages the 
virtual machines. Normally, commercial products have their own. For instance, VMware uses VMware 
vSphere to manage the Hypervisor, while Citrix XenServer can use XenCenter. These consoles bring new 
facilities for administrators to manage their machines, but also open new vulnerabilities. Compromising a 
management console allows an attacker to control all the virtual machines managed by it. This kind of 
technology generally related with the VMM using HTTP/HTTPS whose meaning is the VMM is having 
service running accepting HTTP connection. Xen, for instance, has the XenAPI HTTP Interface that had a 
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Cross-site scripting (XSS) susceptibility, which permitted running a script code in a user’s browser session in 
context of an affected site. HyperVM [66] is a multi-tiered, multi-server, multi-virtualization software which 
allows to create and manage different Virtual Machines (Xen or OpenVZ) each with each Virtual Private 
Server (VPS) having its own operating system. 
 
5.3. Denial of Service 
A Denial of Service (DoS) has the goal to make a computer resource not available to its intended 
users. In virtual machine architecture, resources as CPU, memory, storage  and network are common among 
the host and the guests. It is then probable for a guest machine to force a denial of service (intentional or not) 
to others guest which would also influence the host by captivating all the potential resources of the system. 
When other guests attempt to request a resource, the system will deny that access since there is no resource 
available. VMware has been shown to suffer from several DoS vulnerabilities(4.2). A good approach to 
prevent this attack from a guest is to limit the resources VMs can access. Most of the current virtualization 
technologies have the mechanisms necessary to limit the resources allocated to each guest machine. With the 




This paper is a result of study work about virtual machines, their principal characteristics and 
differences, and the security impact of their utilization. We initially studied the history of the virtual 
machines, following their evolution from the origins, in 1960s until nowadays with its implementation in the 
x86 architecture. We also presented the different components of virtualization, focusing on the problem of 
the x86 architecture that natively did not support virtualization and how some virtualization software 
companies worked around this problem. We have made a study about the current state of art of the main 
server virtualization products, describing their principal characteristics and systems supported. 
The use of virtualization brings many advantages, such as reduction of the hardware resources 
needed with direct impact on cost efficiency, but also security advantages. The latter benefit is commonly 
used to spread the word on virtualization, but we wanted to demystify this myth, presenting some of the 
security problems that server virtualization brought and their impact. We choose two of the main server 
virtualization products commonly used by companies and universities and conducted a vulnerability analysis, 
using as reference the CVEs reported. The conclusion from that analysis is that both products show a similar 
security risk, and they require an extra attention to have their security patches applied. 
Desktop security always brought some concerns to IT administrators and also end users, which had 
their computers infected by virus, worms, or their credentials stolen by some key logger or phishing attack. 
We have described some solutions to this problem, using virtualization. The first solution presented is based 
on type 2 hypervisor. The second solution requires the user to reboot its machine and run a read-only 
bootable media. In this scenario, virtualization would be used to maintain a master version of the bootable 
media installed within a virtual machine, which allows to be updated, and this way create new versions of the 
read-only bootable media with the last updates applied. It was done a security analysis, describing how the 
solution can mitigate some of the security problems faced by a user. I believe that, in a near future, 
virtualization will start being regarded as a desktop security enabling technique rather than just a server 
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